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Abstract
We analyze welfare effects of monetary policy rules when both prices
andwagesarestickyusingthelinear-quadraticframeworkofRotembergand
Woodford (1997). .... Among some simple rules that perform reasonably
well across structural assumptions is a ﬁrst difference version of the classical
rule proposed by Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993).
1 Introduction
The Philips Curve has been a central piece in macroeconomics for decades. The
original work by Philips related wage inﬂation to unemployment. Starting from
microfounded models with sluggish price adjustment, modern macroeconomics
has derived the so called New Keynesian Philips curve relating price inﬂation to
marginal cost and expected future price inﬂation. This relationship is at the cen-
ter of large strand of literature, studying welfare based optimal monetary policy
summarized in Woodford (2003, Chapter 6).
Since the seminal paper by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), it is well
known that the joint analysis of sticky prices and wages has important implica-
tions for the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, a trade off between the
stabilization of wage inﬂation, price inﬂation and the output gap exists for any
kind of shock hitting the economy. Recently, a number of important contributions
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1have pointed to wage stickiness as a crucial feature that allows monetary general
equilibrium models to match the data. In this sense, empirical studies emphasiz-
ing wage rigidities, like Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2004) or Smets and
Wouters (2003) render the joint analysis of sticky wages and sticky prices highly
relevant.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1997) and a number of other authors have
criticized the New Keynesian Philips curve for its inability to capture the persis-
tence in price inﬂation and for putting too much emphasis on forward looking
behavior. In response Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) have included a fraction of rule of
thumb price setters into the standard New Keynesian setup, that gives rise to the
so-called hybrid Philips curve. The hybrid Philips curve relates current inﬂation
to last periods inﬂation, marginal cost and future inﬂation allowing for much more
persistence in inﬂation.
An issue largely neglected until now is the joint analysis of hybrid wage and
price Philips curves for optimal monetary policy.1 What role does rule of thumb
behavior in both wage and price setting play for optimal monetary policy? How
is the performance of simple monetary policy rules affected by the fraction of
backward looking agents in price and wage setting. We take up the question of
optimal monetary policy with sticky wages and prices posed by Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin (2000) and allow for backward looking rule of thumb behavior in both
price and wage setting. Our hybrid price and wage Philips curves are estimated
on Euro area and U.S. data via GMM. The estimates of the structural parameters
are then used in a number of policy questions.2
We derive a purely quadratic welfare based loss function from the model and
compute fully optimal monetary policy under commitment. We show analytically
that a key parameter governing the relative weight on wage inﬂation variability
versus price inﬂation variability is the Frish elasticity of labor supply. For a range
of plausible values taken from micro-econometric estimates between 0.25 and 2,
the weight on the variance of wage inﬂation relative to the weight on the vari-
ance of price inﬂation extends from 15 down to 1.5. Given that this parameter is
crucial for optimal monetary policy, it is very unfortunate that it is typically very
imprecisely estimated in macro models as well as in micro studies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model
which is similar to Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). Section 3 derives the
hybrid wage and price Philips curves from a measure of backward looking wage
and price setters and summarizes the key equations determining general equilib-
1Steinsson (2003) as well as Amato and Laubach (2003b) analyze optimal monetary policy
with fully ﬂexible wages and a hybrid price Philips curve.
2Amato and Laubach (2003a) have estimated parameters governing the wage and price Philips
curves in a fully speciﬁed general equilibrium model, but did not allow for rule of thumb wage
and price setters.
2rium in the model. In section 4 we present our baseline calibration and discuss
the crucial parameters that affect the loss function. Section 5 analyzes the welfare
effects of fully optimal monetary policy as well as of certain popular simple rules
for varying degrees of backward and forward looking wage and price setters. Sec-
tion 7 summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes. Derivations of the proposition are
deferred to the appendix.
2 Model
The model we consider is very similar in its key building blocks to the one in
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), except for rule of thumb wage and price
setters. In particular, capital is in ﬁxed supply in the aggregate. We assume that
there exists an economy wide rental market that allows capital to freely move
between ﬁrms. We abstract from aggregate capital accumulation, because the
derivation of a welfare based loss function for the central bank becomes extremely
cumbersome with aggregate capital accumulation. Edge (2003) shows that the
loss function in such a case additionally involves the variance of the investment
gap, the covariance of the investment gap with the output gap and all future auto-
covariances of the investment gap. The assumption of perfect mobility of capital
is not innocuous, either. It implies that real marginal cost is the same for all
ﬁrms and independent of the quantity produced by any single ﬁrm. We relax this
assumption in our robustness check. Finally, we assume that subsidies exists that
completely offset the effects of monopolistic competition in the steady state. The
assumptionthattheeconomyisefﬁcientinthesteadystateisagainchoseninorder
to avoid highly cumbersome derivations of the loss function that would arise with
an inefﬁcient steady state.3 In the next subsection we start with a discussion of the
households problem.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households with unit mass indexed by h. Households are
inﬁnitely lived, supply labor Nt(h) and receive nominal wage Wt(h), consume
ﬁnalgoodsCt(h), purchasestatecontigentsecuritiesBt(h). Furthermore, theyare
subject to lump sum transfers Tt, hold nominal money balances Mt(h) and receive
proﬁts Γ(h)t from the monopolistic retailers. The utility function is assumed to
be separable in consumption, real money balances and leisure. The representative
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Here Bt is a row vector of state contingent bonds, where each bond pays one
unit in a particular state of nature in the subsequent period. The column vector
δt+1,t represents the price of these bonds. Therefore, the inner product gives total
expenditures for state contingent bonds. Bt−1 is number of state contingent bonds
that pay off in the particular state of nature at time t. The ﬁrst order conditions for
consumption and state contingent bond holdings give rise to the standard Euler
equation. Note that consumption is perfectly insured against idiosyncratic labor










We follow the standard practice to omit the ﬁrst-order condition for money hold-
ings as this equation merely serves to back out the quantity of money that supports
a given nominal interest rate.













A continuum of households supply differentiated labor Nt(h), which is aggre-


















4With probability θw a randomly chosen household is allowed to set its nominal
wage in a given period. The household maximizes expected utility through choice
of the nominal wage subject to the demand curve and the budget constraint. The




















Firms in the ﬁnal good sector produce a homogeneous good, Yt, using intermedi-
ate goods, Yt(z). There are a continuum of intermediate goods a measure unity.











where  > 1. The solution to the problem of optimal factor demand yields the







A continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods ﬁrms owned
by consumers indexed by z ∈ [0,1] uses both labor Lt(z) and capital Kt(z) to




where At is a technology parameter. Capital is freely mobile across ﬁrms rather
than being ﬁrm speciﬁc. Firms rent capital from households in a competitive
market on a period by period basis after they observe the productivity shock. Firm
z chooses Lt(z) and Kt(z) to minimize total cost subject to meeting demand
WtPtLt(z) + ZtKt(z) s.t. AtLt(z)
1−αKt(z)
α − Yt = 0. (10)
Let Xt denote the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the constraint and wr
t the
real wage. The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Lt(z) and Kt(z) are given by
w
r










5The ﬁrst order conditions imply that inputs adjust to equalize marginal cost across
different factors, where the marginal cost of a factor is the ratio of the factor price
to the marginal product. Since all ﬁrms choose the same capital to labor ratio,
marginal cost is equalized across ﬁrms. This will not be true for the case of ﬁrm
speciﬁc capital, where the immobility of capital across ﬁrms prevents ﬁrms from
choosing equal capital to labor ratios.
For price setting, we follow the widely used time dependent pricing approach
of Calvo (1983). In any give period, there is constant probability θ of receiving a
signal that allows the ﬁrm to reset its price. Is the random signal not received, the
ﬁrm carries on the price posted in the last period and satisﬁes any demand at that
price.4
The problem of a ﬁrm that receives a signal to change its price in period t is
to maximize expected real proﬁts as valued by the household in those states of the

























Here, Λt is the households marginal utility of consumption i periods from now
and τt is sales subsidy suitably chosen as to offset the steady state effects of mo-
nopolistic competition (1 + τp = 
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2.3 The ﬂexible price solution and the gaps
In order to obtain welfare in terms of an output gap, it is useful to consider the so-
lution under perfectly ﬂexible prices. As shown in proposition 1 in the appendix,











UC is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption evaluated
at the steady state and ω2 ≡
VNN ¯ N
VN is the elasticity of the marginal utility of labor.
4A markup of price over marginal cost is necessary to ensure that for small positive demand
shocks, the ﬁrm still makes positive proﬁts on the marginal units demanded despite increasing
marginal cost.
5Here we have made use of properties of the Cobb-Douglas Production function, rewriting
total cost as marginal cost times production.
6The subutility functions U(Ct) ≡
C1−σ
t





we have ω2 = χ. Given these functional forms, the natural level of output in log-






χ + α + (1 − α)σ

b At (16)
One can use this equation together with the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition for labor
demand, to derive a key equation for this model. That equation links marginal cost
to the output gap and the gap between the average marginal rate of substitution
















When there are no nominal rigidities in the labor market, the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor is equal to the real wage and the last
term in brackets vanishes. We then recover the condition from sticky price models
that marginal cost is log-linearly related to the output gap. When additionally,
pricesareperfectlyﬂexible, themarginalproductoflaborisequaltotherealwage,
i.e. log marginal cost is zero and it follows that the output gap is zero. These two
gaps, the difference between the real wage and the marginal product of labor and
the difference between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution are at
the center of the welfare analysis.6
3 Hybrid wage and price Philips curves
We allow for backward looking elements in the wage and price setting as pro-
posed by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Gal´ ı, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001). In
particular, we assume that price setters that do receive a signal to re-set their price
belong to one of two groups. A measure ω of backward looking ﬁrms set their














The rule posits that these ﬁrms adjust prices according a geometric average of
priceschangedlastperiodadjustedforlastperiodsinﬂationrate. Theconsumption









6See Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003) for estimating the cost of business cycle variations
on the basis of these gaps.
7Since the fraction of ﬁrms that can change the price is chosen randomly and by





t−1 + (1 − θ)(1 − ω)(P
∗
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As shown in proposition 3 in the appendix, this setup gives rise to the following
hybrid new Keynesian Philips curve
b πt =









Here ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)]. If we assume that capital is no longer freely
mobile, but ﬁrm speciﬁc, proposition 4 in the appendix shows that the Philips
Curve is given by
b πt =
(1 − ω)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
ζ
(1 − α)











t is average marginal cost. Since capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level, the
capital-labor ratio differs across ﬁrms and so does marginal cost. For the optimal
monetary policy analysis, we will consider both common and ﬁrm speciﬁc capital.
Similarly for wage setting, we assume that those households that do receive a
signal to re-set their wages belong to one of two groups. A measure ϕ of backward

























Since the fraction of wage setters that receive the signal to change their wage
is randomly chosen and by the law of large numbers, the aggregate wage index





t−1 + (1 − θw)(1 − ϕ)(W
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As shown in proposition 2 in the appendix This setup gives rise to a hybrid new
Keynesian wage Philips curve
c πw
t =











Here ζw ≡ θw + ϕ[1 − θw(1 − β)] and b µt ≡ χb Lt + σ b Ct − c wr
t.
83.1 The key equations
The model has 6 endogenous variables: price inﬂation πt, wage inﬂation πw
t , la-
bor Lt, output Yt, marginal cost Xt, and the real wage wr
t. We treat the rate of
price inﬂation as the central bank’s instrument. The policymakers problem is to


























b Yt = b At + (1 − α)b Lt (29)
c wr




















ˆ At =ρ ˆ At−1 + ut (33)
Here:
b µt ≡ χb Lt + σb Yt − c wr
t
ζw ≡ θw + ϕ[1 − θw(1 − β)]
ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)]
Upper case letters denote the aggregate of the respective lower case variables.
(27) and (27) are the wage and price Philips curves. (29) is the log-linearized
production function. It has been pointed out by Yun (1996) that the full non-linear














dz and ˆ Dt = θ ˆ Dt−1 (34)
7The consumption Euler equation does not impose a constraint on the policymaker. It serves
merely to back out the path of the nominal instrument that supports the optimal allocation for
given optimal paths of output and inﬂation.
9Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) have shown that the price dispersion
term can be ignored for a loglinear analysis around a steady state with zero price
dispersion. One can further show that this term evolves as a univariate AR(1)
regardless of the fraction of backward looking price setters by log-linearizing the
price index and the price dispersion term. (30) is the ﬁrm’s labor demand function.
(31)isanidentitydeﬁningthechangetheoftherealwage. (31)linksmarginalcost
to the output gap and the ”wage gap”. That wage gap is the difference between
the average marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor on the
hand and the real wage on the other, see proposition 1 in the appendix. Finally,
the last equation is the exogenous stochastic process is total factor productivity.
The welfare measure of the central bank is expected discounted lifetime utility
of a randomly drawn household. As is common in the literature, we neglect the

















where the unconditional expectation E averages across all possible histories of
aggregate shocks. Let W∗
t denote period utility under perfectly ﬂexible wages
and prices. Following proposition 5 in the appendix, the consumption equivalent
welfare measure L ≡ −
P∞





can be approximated up to









t + ˜ λ1
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2 +˜ λ2 (∆b πt)
2 + ˜ λ3c πw2







Since this loss function is free of ﬁrst moments, it can be accurately evaluated by
considering a linear approximation to the models equilibrium conditions. Here,
the weights are given by
˜ λ0 =0.5
θ































(1−θ)(1−θβ) and ˜ λ2 adjust
accordingly. Any number for the loss function has no economic interpretation.
However, the difference between two numbers when comparing alternative policy
rules is an approximation of the one off increase in consumption (as a fraction of
steady state consumption) necessary to make an average agent equally well off
under both policies. 8
4 Calibration
We use the baseline calibration from the sticky price model of Pappa (2004) and
assume symmetric price and wage setting parameters. In particular, the markup
is 14 % in both goods and labor market resulting in κ =  = 7.88. Furthermore
assume that prices and wages are ﬁxed on average 4 quarters, such that θ = θw =
3
4. Set the fraction of backward looking agents in both price and wage setting
to 0. Furthermore assume the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion σ = 2 and
assume a Frisch (constant marginal utility of wealth) elasticity of labor supply of
1
3, implying χ = 3. The exogenous process for technology follows an AR(1) with
autoregressive parameter equal to 0.906. The innovation has standard deviation
equal to 0.00852. Finally the time preference rate is matched to yield an annual
real interest rate of 1.03, i.e. β = 1.03−0.25 These parameters give rise to the
following weights in the loss function for the case of perfectly mobile capital:
˜ λ0 = 23.30, ˜ λ1 = 6.21, ˜ λ3 = 200.91 (42)
Note that the weight on wage inﬂation is almost an order of magnitude larger than
on price inﬂation for our benchmark calibration despite the fact that the average
duration of wage contracts is the same as for price contracts. This is a result of a
low wage elasticity. With stick wages, labor supply is demand determined. The
inverse of the labor supply elasticity signals how much compensation in terms of
real wage the household requires for supplying an extra unit of labor. With sticky
wages households are induced to vary their labor supply without any such com-
pensation taking place.9 Therefore, it is clear that the inverse of the labor supply
8Note that by dividing by the marginal utility of consumption (which has dimension utils per
unit of consumption) we are expressing welfare in terms of units of consumption. Further divid-
ing by steady state consumption we express the measure as percentage compensation necessary
to achieve the same level of welfare as under ﬂexible prices and wages. It should be noted how-
ever, that the derivation of this consumption equivalent welfare measure involved dropping terms
which are independent of policy. Therefore any single consumption equivalent number has no
economic meaning. The difference between any two numbers is meaningful, as the omitted terms
independent of policy would drop out anyways once we form the difference.
9The assumption of complete consumption insurance implies that household are free of any
income risk stemming from wage stickiness. Dropping this assumption, would further increase
11elasticity is closely related to the welfare cost of nominal wage stickiness. For in-
stance, setting χ = 1 brings the weight on wage inﬂation relative to price inﬂation
down to 2.8 for our benchmark calibration. Another important parameter deter-
mining the relative weight is the wage elasticity of labor demand κ. The higher
this parameter, the more substitutable are different varieties of labor in production.
Differences in relative quantities of labor demanded by the labor aggregator are a
function of differences in relative wages posted and that function is increasing in
the substitutability (κ) of labor varieties in the aggregator. For instance, reducing
the markup in both labor and goods market to 10% (κ =  = 11) increases the
weight on wage inﬂation stabilization to 15.75
5 Comparison of monetary policy rules
This section analyzes both simple monetary policy rules and fully optimal policy.
The system of ﬁrst-order conditions for the fully optimal policy problem can be
found in the appendix on page 33. We restrict the analysis to monetary policy
under commitment, because the rules we consider are very simple and therefore
easy to communicate. Furthermore, the analysis of discretion vs. commitment
with backward looking elements in price setting has already been conducted in
Steinsson (2003), we expect results to be similar in this setup.
The measure of welfare we consider is the expectation as of time zero 10 of
expected discounted lifetime utility as in (36). In the following table, for any




We start the analysis by considering the fully optimal rule and three simple
rules for a range of fractions of forward and backward looking wage and price
setters. The simple rule we consider are complete output gap stabilization V[ˆ Yt −
ˆ Y ∗
t ] = 0, complete wage inﬂation stabilization V[c πw
t] = 0 and complete price
inﬂation stabilization V[b πt] = 0.
5.1 Optimal simple rules
In this subsection, we consider a class of simple interest rate rules of the following
form
ˆ it = α0 ˆ Gt + α1ˆ πt + α2c πw
t + α3ˆ it−1 (43)
the welfare costs of wage stickiness.
10We assume the economy is in the steady at time zero.
12We maximize welfare numerically subject to the condition that the equilibrium
be determinate11. We consider how welfare is affected by successively restricting
the rules to respond to less variables. We eliminate the output gap from the rule,
as authors such as Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004) and Neiss and Nelson (2003)
have noted that the theoretically correct measure of output gap (actual minus ﬂex-
ible price output) is difﬁcult to obtain in practice and may be badly proxied by
non model based concepts such as detrended output. Finally, Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (2004) have shown that responding to an incorrect measures of the gap,
such as deviation from steady state, can involve large welfare losses . Given this
risk, it seems natural ask how rules perform that neglect the output gap altogether.
We furthermore eliminate the lagged interest rate from the reaction function in
order to measure the gains from inertia. It has often been argued that reacting to
the lagged interest rate is a simple way to introduce history dependence into the
policy rate. Such inertia in simple rules may mimick the history dependence that
is an important feature of the fully optimal plan under commitment with forward
looking agents. Finally, we consider two rules that have often been proposed in
the literature: The ﬁrst one the classic Taylor (1993) rule:
ˆ it = 0.5 ˆ Gt + 1.5ˆ πt (44)
Finally, Amato and Laubach (2003a) found that a ﬁrst difference version of
this rule performed well in a model with rule of thumb price setters and consumers
and it seems natural to consider it here as well. In that version of the rule, the rate
of change of the nominal interest rate responds the output gap and price inﬂation
with coefﬁcients as suggested in Taylor (1993).
∆ˆ it = 0.5 ˆ Gt + 1.5ˆ πt (45)
Before discussing the performance of these simple rules, we undertake an even
simpler analysis and compute the welfare costs of rules that fully stabilized one of
three variables: price level, wage level and output gap. The detailed results are de-
ferred for the appendix on page 35. Note that in the absence of wage rigidities, full
stabilization of the price level or equivalently the output gap is the optimal rule. 12
11Since equilibrium selection under indeterminacy is controversial, we require that the optimal
rules implies determinacy. The algorithm assigns an arbitrarily large loss to rules that render
the equilibrium indeterminate. Therefore the loss function is discontinous at the boundary of the
determinacy region and standard MATLAB (Version 6.0) minimization routines are not applicable.
We use the ”cliff-robust” minimization routine csminwel.m, that can deal with such setups. It is
provided by C. Sims at http://eco-072399b.princeton.edu/yftp/optimize
12This follows from the absence of any time varying inefﬁciencies such that price inﬂation and
the output gap are linearly related, see equation (17). Therefore, achieving zero variance for price
inﬂationimplieszerovariancefortheoutputgapandwelfareunderstickypricesisequaltowelfare
under ﬂexible prices.
13It turns out that the rules that are optimal when only prices are sticky, involve large
losses when wages are sticky additionally. The loss from full price level stability
ranges from XXX to XXX for varying degrees of backward looking agents in
wage and price setting. ....
In the following table, coefﬁcients with an asteriks as superscripts are imposed
as a restriction, all other coefﬁcients are optimized
6 Speciﬁc factor markets
So far we have assumed that capital is freely mobile across sectors and can be
reallocated as to equalize the shadow value of capital across ﬁrms. It has been
argued by Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Woodford (2003, p.166) and others
that capital cannot be instantaneously be relocated across ﬁrms. In particular, it
appears to be highly unreasonable that it is too costly to post a new price tag,
but that it is costless to unbolt machinery and ship it between ﬁrms. Further-
more, Eichenbaum and Fischer (2004) show that departing from the assumption
of perfect capital mobility is necessary to reconcile the Calvo (1983) model with
the data. Sveen and Weinke (2004) further discuss the implications of modeling
capital for the equilibrium dynamics in sticky prices models
For the purpose of business cycle analysis, capital might better be modeled as
being ﬁrm speciﬁc. In this subsection, we solve the ﬁrms price setting problem
when capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level. The problem of the ﬁrm is now to choose
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Pt(z) , the ﬁrst order condition





















With ﬁrm speciﬁc capital, proposition 4 in the appendix shows that the Philips
Curve is given by
b πt =
(1 − ω)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
ζ
(1 − α)










14Table 1: Optimal and simple rules - mobile capital
(ω,ϕ) rule α0 α1 α2 α3 L
(0,0)
optimal - - - - 3.441
rule 1 9.48 6.49 8.57 3.05 3.444
rule 2 0∗ 4.21 20.96 0.81 3.444
rule 3 0∗ 141.85 951.19 0∗ 3.492
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 27.826
Taylor FD 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 1∗ 4.308
(1
2,0)
optimal - - - - 3.678
rule 1 5814.47 2937.22 -80.66 1392.04 3.680
rule 2 0∗ 9.56 37.45 -0.73 3.767
rule 3 0∗ 5.85 21.55 0∗ 3.779
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 28.37
Taylor FD 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 1∗ 4.557
(0, 1
2)
optimal - - - - 3.557
rule 1 0.11 1.66 7.75 0.98 3.561
rule 2 0∗ 1.60 7.70 0.96 3.561
rule 3 0∗ 4.56 28.16 0∗ 4.021
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 32.488




optimal - - - - 3.826
rule 1 7.70 13.45 51.62 2.25 3.831
rule 2 0∗ 5.17 26.93 0.87 3.835
rule 3 0∗ 11.26 61.00 0∗ 3.893
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 32.850
Taylor FD 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 1∗ 5.02
15Here, ˆ Xa
t is average marginal cost. Since capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level, the
capital-labor ratio differs across ﬁrms and so does marginal cost.
When we assume that capital is ﬁxed at the level of an individual ﬁrm, the
weight on price inﬂation in the loss function rises roughly by a factor 15 to 364.23,
while the weights on the variability of the output gap and wage inﬂation remain
the same. Price dispersion becomes much more costly now, since costs of output
dispersion across producers rise. Price dispersion implies that the bundler de-
mands different varieties in relative quantities that are socially inefﬁcient. With
ﬁrm speciﬁc capital, we have an additional inefﬁciency. Now each ﬁrm is produc-
ing the wrong quantities with the ”wrong” mix of factor inputs. For both common
and speciﬁc capital, a given dispersion of relative prices leads to a the same dis-
persion of relative quantities. However, ﬁrm speciﬁc capital implies that a given
dispersion in relative quantities results in a much bigger dispersion of labor across
ﬁrms. That follows from ﬁrms inability to re-allocate capital to produce with the
efﬁcient capital labor ratio. Capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level, the ﬁrm can only
adjust labor to vary production. Since labor has decreasing marginal product in
production at the level of the individual ﬁrm, the dispersion of labor across ﬁrms is
welfare reducing.13 Therefore, the weight attached to price inﬂation rises strongly
with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital.
A greater weight on the price inﬂation variability does not imply that price
inﬂation targeting is more desirable with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital than with mobile
capital. The reason is that the structural equations change, too. In particular,
the slope of the price Philips curve falls by factor 15 from 0.0852 to 0.0055. A
given disturbance to marginal cost results in much less price inﬂation with ﬁrm
speciﬁc capital. Therefore, it may very well be the case that strong wage inﬂation
targeting remains a desirable policy despite the fact that price inﬂation receives a
much higher weight in the loss function with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital.
We now consider the performance of simple rules for the case of immobile
capital. As noted earlier, immobile capital strongly raises the weight on price
inﬂation variability in the loss function. At the same time it, the price Philips
curve implies that a given disturbance to marginal cost has much less of an impact
on price inﬂation. It is therefore a priori unclear how the results from the analysis
of freely mobile capital will change.
13If production were linear in labor, the weights attached to price inﬂation variability would be
the same across mobile and ﬁrm speciﬁc capital. Dispersion of labor across ﬁrms would still be
welfare reducing, but only because it is identical to the dispersion of output across ﬁrms. Since
each variety has decreasing marginal product in the bundler, dispersion of output is again welfare
reducing.
16Table 2: Optimal and simple rules - immobile capital
(ω,ϕ) rule α0 α1 α2 α3 L
(0,0)
optimal - - - - 2.636
rule 1 11.95 4.82 5.55 1.97 2.658
rule 2 0∗ 231,697.27 299,570.44 4,816.31 2.661
rule 3 0∗ 54,935.89 69,025.37 0∗ 2.682
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 21.746
Taylor FD 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 1∗ 2.855
(1
2,0)
optimal - - - - 3.177
rule 1 124.28 318.82 344.55 21.70 3.219
rule 2 0∗ 32.23 25.64 -0.84 3.446
rule 3 0∗ 18.41 14.13 0∗ 3.465
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 26.047
Taylor FD 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 1∗ 3.401
(0, 1
2)
optimal - - - - 2.749
rule 1 143.39 26.77 43.87 2.86 2.754
rule 2 0∗ 6.40 8.50 1.19 2.783
rule 3 0∗ 19.65 23.09 0∗ 3.14
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 24.869




optimal - - - - 3.349
rule 1 29.09 11.49 4.02 3.10 3.365
rule 2 0∗ 453.98 543.12 2.80 3.379
rule 3 0∗ 351.36 409.14 0∗ 3.381
Taylor 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 0∗ 29.410
Taylor FD 0.5∗ 1.5∗ 0∗ 1∗ 3.694
177 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has evaluated the welfare effects of monetary policy rules in a simple
general equilibrium model with sticky wages and prices. It has analyzed fully
optimal policy and simple monetary policy rules in variants of the baseline model
ofErceg, Henderson, andLevin(2000). Wechoseourdeparturesfromtheseminal
paper at modeling points with very little consensus among macro-economists.
First, we depart from the assumption of full rationality and purely forward
looking behavior by allowing a fraction of wage and price setters to be backward
looking. This is in the spirit of rule of thumb consumers as in Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) test of the life cycle hypothesis and was ﬁrst suggested for price
setters by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999). Second, following the criticism in Danthine
and Donaldson (2002), we depart from the assumption of a frictionless rental
market for capital that instantaneously and costlessly allows to reallocate capital
across ﬁrms . Instead we model capital as ﬁxed at business cycle frequency. Fi-
nally, we scrutinize Calvo (1983) price and wage contracts. It has been pointed
out by Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004) that Calvo (1983) contracts imply much
more price dispersion than comparable schemes with ﬁnite horizon. We allow
for a general contract scheme as suggested in Wolman (1999) that encompasses
Taylor (1980) contracts as a special case and can pick up some salient features of
state dependent pricing of Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999).
Introducing backward looking wage and price setters increases the cost of any
given monetary policy rules, but only moderately. When some contracts are de-
termined by backward looking agents, inﬂation is more persistent. A shock to
inﬂation today affects inﬂation in future periods, because some agents are back-
ward looking. While inﬂation is more persistent it is also less variable.
18Appendix
Proposition 1 (marginal cost). Up to ﬁrst order, marginal costs is related to the
















Proof of proposition 1: Log-linearize the ﬁrst order condition for labor demand
c wr
t = −αb Lt + b At + b Xt (50)
Deﬁne b µt ≡ χb Lt + σ b Ct − c wr
t. Subtracting the marginal rate of substitution,
χˆ Lt + σˆ Yt, from both sides of the above expression, one obtains
−ˆ µt = [−χ − α] b Lt − σb Yt + b At + b Xt (51)














b At + b Xt (52)













χ + α + σ(1 − α)

b At + b Xt (53)







b Yt − c Y ∗
t

− b µt (54)
Proposition 2 (hybrid wage Philips curve). Under Calvo wage setting with a















Here ζw ≡ θw + ϕ[1 − θw(1 − β)].
Proof of proposition 2: We assume the wage subsidy is set to exactly offset
impact of the monopolistic competition in the steady state 1 + τ = κ
κ−1. We can





Lt and VN(Nt(h))t =
−Nt(h)χ as well as UC(Ct(h)) = C
−σ
t to express it in terms of the optimal nomi-
nal wage W ∗


































 = 0 (55)























































































These inﬁnite sums have a recursive representation. The behavior of optimizing




































Wt . Log-linearize the deﬁnition of the wage index












t =(1 − ϕ)c w∗
t−1 + ϕc wb
t−1 − c πw
t + c πw
t−1 (64)
20Use the ﬁrst equation to eliminate c wb




(1 − θw)ϕ + θw




(1 − ϕ)(1 − θw)
c πw
t−1 (65)
Log-Linearizing the auxiliary equations deﬁning recursively the condition for op-
timal wage setting around a steady state with zero wage inﬂation yields
b Dt =(1 − βθw)(1 + χ)b Lt + βθκ(1 + χ)c πw
t+1 + βθw b Dt+1 (66)




t + b Lt − σ b Ct
i
+ βθ(κ − 1)c πw
t+1 + βθw b Gt+1 (67)
Substituting these two equations into the log-linearized ﬁrst order condition for
















Substituting out c w∗
t one arrives at
c πw
t =











Here, b µt ≡ χb Lt + σ b Ct − c wr
t and ζw ≡ θw + ϕ[1 − θw(1 − β)].
Proposition 3 (hybrid price Philips curve). Under Calvo price setting with a
measure ω of backward looking ﬁrms, the hybrid new Keynesian price Philips
curve is
b πt =









Here ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)].
Proof of proposition 3: Focussing on a symmetric equilibrium and therefore














It is again convenient to rewrite the Calvo price setting condition in terms of sta-




























t stands for the optimal nominal price P ∗
t divided by the current period price
index Pt. The inﬁnite discounted sums Bt and Ft have a recursive representation,
where we have expressed the stochastic discount factor Λt,t+i by the ratio of the
marginal utilities of consumption:






















Pt . Log-linearize the deﬁnition of the price index (20)











t =(1 − ω)b p∗
t−1 + ωb pb
t−1 − b πt + b πt−1 (77)
Use the ﬁrst equation to eliminate b pb




(1 − θ)ω + θ
(1 − ω)(1 − θ)
b πt −
ω
(1 − ω)(1 − θ)
b πt−1 (78)
The log-linearized ﬁrst order condition for price setting of forward looking ﬁrms
(71), (74) and (75) around a steady state with zero price inﬂation yields
b p∗
t = (1 − θβ) b Xt + βθ
 




Substituting out b p∗
t one arrives at
b πt =









Here ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)].
Proposition 4 (Price Philips curve with speciﬁc factor markets). Under Calvo
price setting with a measure ω of backward looking ﬁrms, the hybrid new Keyne-
sian price Philips curve for the case of speciﬁc factor markets is
b πt =









Here ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)].
Proof of proposition 4: Using the production function to express hours in terms
of output, using the demand function, recalling that the subsidy offsets the steady







































































































































































23Note that for any ﬁrm z loglinear marginal cost (i.e the ratio of the real wage




αb Y (z)t − ˆ At

. Since ﬁrms post
difference prices, they sell different quantities, and marginal cost differs across
ﬁrms. Up to log-linearization, the output aggregator equals the average over its
individual components, i.e
R 1
0 ˆ Y (z)tdz = ˆ Yt + O(||ξ||2). Therefore, ˆ Xa





αˆ Yt − ˆ At

is a ﬁrst order approximation of average marginal cost.
Substituting out b p∗
t and using steps similar as for speciﬁc factor markets, one
arrives at
b πt =
(1 − ω)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
ζ
(1 − α)










Proposition 5 (loss function). Deﬁne average utility across households





t denote average utility under ﬂexible prices and wages. With Calvo wage
andpricesetting, wecanapproximatethelossfunctionL ≡ −
P∞
t=0 βt (Wt − W∗
t)/UC ¯ C









t + ˜ λ1






2 +˜ λ2 (∆b πt)
2 + ˜ λ3c πw2





































Proofofproposition5(followingErceg, Henderson, andLevin(2000)): Some
relations are used repeatedly throughout this text. For a generic variable Xt, let
24˜ Xt ≡ Xt − ¯ X denote arithmetic deviation from the steady state ¯ X, let c Xt ≡
logXt − log ¯ X denote logarithmic deviation. Up to second order, the relation be-
tween the two is


















the logarithmic approximation is
b Xt ≈Ej b Xt(j) +
1
2
φVARj b Xt(j). (93)
Here, the cross-sectional mean is denoted by Ej and the cross-sectional variance
is denoted by VARj. Finally, let ||ξ|| denote an upper bound to the exogenous
disturbances. The goal of the following paragraphs is to approximate all expres-
sions involving integrals across households indexed by h or across ﬁrms indexed
by z, in terms of aggregate variables. Approximations are second order Taylor
expansions, i.e. terms of order higher than two are omitted.15
Equipped with these simple tools, (35) can be approximated in the following
way. The second order approximation to the utility of consumption is









Here, O(||ξ||3) denotes a residual that is third order or higher in the bound on the
exogenous disturbance. Taking unconditional expectation 16
EU(Ct) = UC ¯ C

E b Ct +
1
2






UC is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption evaluated at
the steady state. The second order approximation to the utility of labor is




VN ¯ N + VNN ¯ N
2 b N
2
t (h) + O(||ξ||
3)
15Omitting all terms of order higher than two implies that when substitutions into squares of
variables are undertaken, only the ﬁrst order terms of the Taylor expansion of these variables are
substituted.
16We are using the fact that up to ﬁrst order Ct has mean zero, so that up to second order the
centered and uncentered second moments are equal, i.e. E b C2
t = (E b C)2 + VARb Ct = VARb Ct +
O(||ξ||3).















The term ω2 ≡
VNN ¯ N
VN is the elasticity of marginal utility of labor evaluated at the









b Lt =Eh b Nt(h) +
κ − 1
2κ
VARh b Nt(h) + O(||ξ||
3) (96)
























We need to eliminate Lt in order to arrive at an output gap term, consider the
second order approximation to total demand for labor Lt =
R 1
0 Lt(z)dz
b Lt ≡logEzLt(z) − log¯ L = Ezb Lt(z) +
1
2
VARzb Lt(z) + O(||ξ||
3) (99)
Since all ﬁrms face the same relative price of capital and the labor bundler, they
have the same capital-labor ratio. This fact, together with a ﬁxed aggregate capital
stock gives rise to the following exact loglinear relation derived from the produc-
tion function.
Ezb Lt(z) =Ezb Yt(z) − b At + αb Lt (100)
VARzb Lt(z) =VARzb Yt(z) (101)
From the deﬁnition of the output bundler, we have





VARzb Yz(z) + O(||ξ||
3) (102)
Substituting (100) into yields (99)
b Lt =Ezb Yt(z) − b At + αb Lt +
1
2
VARzb Yt(z) + O(||ξ||
3) (103)












Substituting for b Lt and b L2






















−1 + ω2)VARh b Nt(h) + O(||ξ||
3)
Combining the approximations of the sub-utility function for consumption and for
labor, yields
W =UC ¯ C

E b Ct +
1
2





























−1 + ω2)VARh b Nt(h) + O(||ξ||
3)
The model features no aggregate capital accumulation, hence Ct = Yt. Further-
more, since the labor-leisure decision is not distorted in the steady state, we have
that (1−α)UC ¯ Y = −VN ¯ N.17 Together these two conditions ensure that all linear
terms cancel, except terms which are independent of policy and therefore do not


















− 2(1 − α)(κ
−1 + ω2)VARh b Nt(h) + t.i.p. + O(||ξ||
3)
As such the above model is free of ﬁrst order terms and can be accurately eval-
uated using a linear approximation to the models equilibrium conditions. It has
become customary in the literature to rewrite the expressions in terms of the out-
put gap Yt − Y ∗
t . This aids in our economic interpretation of the policy problem.
Subtracting from this equation W∗, the second order approximation to the utility
17This follows from the ﬁrst order condition for labor supply UC
w
p = −VN and w
p = (1−α) Y
N
27function evaluated in a model with completely ﬂexible prices and wages and an
efﬁcient level of output Y ∗





































−1 + ω2)VARh b Nt(h) + t.i.p. + O(||ξ||
3)
To rewrite the expression in terms of an output gap, we proceed in the following
way. Using the deﬁnition of the natural level of output, and deﬁning the term

































































t (b Yt − b Y
∗
t ) (108)








+ λ2VARh b Nt(h) + λ3VARzb Yt(z) + t.i.p + O(||ξ||
3)
(109)






















/(UC ¯ C). Further, de-
ﬁne ∆N
t ≡ VARh logNt(h) and similarly ∆Y
t ≡ VARz logYt(z). Note that
it follows from proposition 8 that the inﬁnite discounted sum of cross-sectional





















3) + t.i.p. (111)
18Since policy has no effect on welfare with completely ﬂexible prices, this is equivalent to
adding a constant in any maximization problem: It will change the value of the objective function,
but not the value of the maximand.

























3) + t.i.p. (112)
Using these expressions, we arrive at (92).
Proposition 6 (loss function with immobile capital). When capital is immobile
attheﬁrmlevel, wecanapproximatethelossfunctionL ≡ −
P∞
t=0 βt (Wt − W∗
t)/UC ¯ C
by a loss function of the same form as with freely mobile capital. The weights in
the loss function attached to the variance of price inﬂation and the variance of the


















Proof of proposition 6: Here we sketch on the part of the derivation that is dif-
ferent from the case with mobile capital. The following loglinear relation derived
from the production function holds exactly
Ez ˆ Yt(z) = ˆ At + (1 − α)Ezˆ Lt(z) (113)
It follows that VARzˆ Lt(z) = 1
(1−α)2VARz ˆ Yt(z). Solving for ˆ L(z)t, substituting
















VARz ˆ Yt(z) (114)





























−1 + ω2)VARh b Nt(h) + O(||ξ||
3)
Following similar steps as before one can show that the weight on dispersion of








the same steps as for mobile capital we arrive at the new weights.
29Proposition 7 (wage dispersion with backward looking wage setters). With a
measure of backward looking wage setters, the cross sectional dispersion of labor
∆N
t ≡ VARh logNt(h) is related to wage inﬂation logπw
t ≡ logWt − logWt−1

































Proceed further in the following steps. Deﬁne ¯ Wt ≡ Eh logWt(h). Note that
¯ Wt − ¯ Wt−1 =Eh






logWt−1(h) − ¯ Wt−1

(119)




















t − ¯ Wt−1

(120)
Note that, the difference between ¯ Wt and logWt is second order and therefore up
to ﬁrst order, the left hand side of (121) is the log of wage inﬂation.
logπ
w













Note further that taking logs of the deﬁnition of the rule of thumb, recalling that
logπw
t−1 − ¯ Wt−1 = − ¯ Wt−2 + O(||ξ||2) and using (121) we have immediately
logW
b







Similarly take logs of the rule of thumb, solve for logW ∗
t−1 and subtract ¯ Wt−2 on
both sides to arrive at
logW
∗














t−1 − ¯ Wt−2
	
(123)
30Forwarding this equation one period recalling that the difference between logWt
and ¯ Wt is second order and making use of (122) twice, we arrive at
logW
∗
t (h) − ¯ Wt−1 =
1










Next, consider the measure of wage dispersion ∆W
t ≡ VARh logWt(h). Sine










logWt(h) − ¯ Wt−1
2o




logWt−1(h) − ¯ Wt−1
2o
− ( ¯ Wt − ¯ Wt−1)
2 (127)




t (h) − ¯ Wt−1)
2 + ϕ(logW
b




t−1 + (1 − θw)(1 − ϕ)(logW
∗
t (h) − ¯ Wt−1)
2
+ (1 − θw)ϕ(logW
b
t (h) − ¯ Wt−1)
2 − ( ¯ Wt − ¯ Wt−1)
2 (128)




















Finally solving for ∆N
t by making use of (117) we arrive at (121).
Proposition 8 (price dispersion with backward looking price setters). With a
measureofbackwardlookingpricesetters, thecrosssectionaldispersionofoutput
∆Y





















Proof of proposition 8: The proof follows similar steps as for wage dispersion
and is omitted.
Proposition 9 (output and labor dispersion with Wolman (1999) pricing). Un-
der the Wolman (1999) pricing scheme with a maximum of J cohorts of ﬁrms
charging identical prices, whose fraction of the overall price index are denoted by
31ωj, we have the following approximation of dispersion of output across producers
and of labor across households















j (logWt,j − logWt)
2 + O(||ξ||
3) (132)
Proof of proposition 9: Note again from the demand function faced by an in-
dividual producer that VARz logY (z)t = 2VARz logP(z)t. Using that the dif-
ference between logPt and Ez logPt(z) is second order and that Pt is independent
of z, we have that
VARz logY (z)t =
2VARz (logP(z)t − logPt) (133)
=
2Ez (logP(z)t − logPt)
2 − 
2 (Ez logP(z)t − Pt)
2 (134)
=







ωj (logPt,j − logPt)
2 + O(||ξ||
3) (136)
The last equality follows from the fact that all ﬁrms in cohort j charge the same
price and that these cohorts have weights in the price index are also the the prob-
abilities of any ﬁrm z charging price Pt,j. Analogous steps can be done to prove
the second part of the proposition.
Corollary. It follows immediately, that for N period overlapping Taylor (1980)
contracts, output dispersion can be approximated by





E (logPt,j − logPt)
2 + O(||ξ||
3) (137)
Proposition 10 (loss function with Wolman (1999) pricing). Under the Wol-
man (1999) pricing scheme with a maximum of J cohorts of ﬁrms (assuming only



































with: ˜ λ0 =
1
2














32Proof of proposition 10: This follows immediately by plugging in the results
from proposition 9 on page 31 into (109).
The Lagrangian of the policy problem:
Deﬁne Gt ≡ ˆ Yt − ˆ Y ∗
t substitute out the Yt from the policy problem to reduce the









t + ˜ λ1 ˆ G
2
t + ˜ λ2 (∆b πt)
2 + ˜ λ3c πw2















(1 − ϕ)(1 − θw)(1 − βθw)
(1 + κχ)ζw

















































































ζw ≡ θw + ϕ[1 − θw(1 − β)] and ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)].









t + ˜ λ1 ˆ G
2
t + ˜ λ2 (∆b πt)
2 + ˜ λ3c πw2














t + ξ1 b Xt + ξ2 ˆ Gt + ξ3c πw













































− b Xt + ξ8 ˆ Gt − ξ9b Lt − σ ˆ At + c wr
t
i
Here, the coefﬁcients are given
ξ1 = −
(1 − ϕ)(1 − θw)(1 − βθw)
(1 + κχ)ζw

























ξ9 =χ + σ(1 − α)
34The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are








































t : 0 = 2˜ λ3c πw
t + 2˜ λ4

(1 + β)c πw
t − c πw















Some simple policy rules
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optimal 0.351 0.431 0.271 0.026 0.015 3.252
P stabil 2.619 0 0 0.255 0.118 11.802
W stabil 1.786 1.055 0.746 0 0 5.990
G stabil 0 0.414 0.157 0.294 0.065 13.641
(1
4,0)
optimal 0.340 0.381 0.147 0.028 0.016 3.400
P stabil 2.619 0 0 0.255 0.118 11.802
W stabil 1.806 0.957 0.419 0 0 6.412
G stabil 0 0.401 0.090 0.294 0.065 13.767
(1
2,0)
optimal 0.316 0.346 0.077 0.030 0.016 3.457
P stabil 2.619 0 0 0.255 0.118 11.802
W stabil 1.844 0.879 0.220 0 0 6.568
G stabil 0 0.397 0.049 0.294 0.065 13.874
(0, 1
4)
optimal 0.388 0.454 0.283 0.022 0.008 3.370
P stabil 2.755 0 0 0.249 0.066 12.840
W stabil 1.786 1.055 0.746 0 0 5.990




optimal 0.375 0.404 0.154 0.024 0.008 3.528
P stabil 2.775 0 0 0.249 0.066 12.840
W stabil 1.806 0.957 0.419 0 0 6.412




optimal 0.346 0.368 0.081 0.026 0.009 3.593
P stabil 2.775 0 0 0.249 0.066 12.840
W stabil 1.844 0.879 0.220 0 0 6.568
G stabil 0 0.454 0.052 0.334 0.038 16.427
(0, 1
2)
optimal 0.463 0.475 0.287 0.019 0.004 3.447
P stabil 3.149 0 0 0.254 0.035 13.965
W stabil 1.786 1.055 0.746 0 0 5.990




optimal 0.450 0.425 0.157 0.021 0.004 3.613
P stabil 3.149 0 0 0.254 0.035 13.965
W stabil 1.806 0.957 0.419 0 0 6.412




optimal 0.413 0.391 0.083 0.022 0.004 3.694
P stabil 3.149 0 0 0.254 0.035 13.965
W stabil 1.844 0.879 0.220 0 0 6.568
G stabil 0 0.646 0.059 0.467 0.022 23.115
39